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This paper examines delinquency, profitability, and outreach determinants of microfinance 
institutions’ (MFIs) performance in Russia and the Caucasus. The estimation is done using the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. The estimation results suggest that Russian 
and Caucasian MFIs are profit-driven but are expected to improve outreach in the long-run. 
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JEL Classifications: G20, G21 Introduction  
Microfinance is a financial tool developed to spur economic development and promote 
business engagement of the poor. Poor people exposed to risks and external shocks often lose 
their unstable sources of income are considered “non-bankable” by commercial financial 
institutions. Therefore, the goal of microfinance is to make financial services, including 
microcredit, accessible to the poor.  
In Russia and the Caucasus countries, microfinance is fairly new phenomenon. First 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) appeared in the region in the mid 1900s. The disintegration of 
the USSR led to the decline in income and the disappearance of social welfare system. Assuming 
$2/day poverty line, poverty rates increased from 2% to 21% during the period between 1988 
and 1998 (Forster et al., 2003). In addition, ethnic conflicts that erupted after the USSR’s 
dissolution contributed to poverty increase, including the civil war in Russia (North Caucasus 
region), Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (Bossoutrot, 2005).  The poor in the former USSR 
region are literate and predominantly well-educated people who were left outside the productive 
process and were desperately trying to learn how to survive in a raw market structure and 
disrupted economy (Forster et al., 2003). They are both people fully relying on social welfare 
benefits and working age individuals, many of them with higher education, looking for jobs 
(Bossoutrot, 2005).  
The primary goal of this research is to perform comparative analysis of the performance 
of microfinance institutions in Russia vs. MFIs in the Caucasus to assess factors responsible for 
achieving and maintaining financial sustainability of MFIs. Specifically, this study examines 
how various aspects of MFIs’ operations, including fund sourcing, staffing, and gender policies, 
affect the loan size, interest, and loan delinquency rates. The results of this analysis will enable microfinance providers and policy makers to review and possibly revise strategies and policies to 
improve the efficiency of financial services and effectively address the needs of growing 
microfinance sectors in their respective countries. 
Literature Review: MFIs Sustainability vs. Outreach  
MFIs aim at “a double bottom-line” that is a combination of financial and social returns 
(Brau and Woller, 2004). The tension between sustainability and outreach triggers a serious 
problem of the “mission drift” that occurs when MFIs, trying to reach financial self-sufficiency, 
tend to concentrate on relatively low-risk clients that require higher loan amounts, thus limiting 
their social outreach and drifting away from their true mission of  poverty alleviation (Arena, 
2008; Augsburg and Fouillet, 2010; Nawaz, 2010). Whereas several studies confirm the 
existence of the  “mission drift” (Cull et al., 2007; Augsburg and Fouillet, 2010; Nawaz, 2010), 
other studies suggest that financial sustainability and social outreach complement and reinforce 
each other (Gonzalez and Rosenberg, 2006; Schicks, 2007; Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2011). 
The current study approaches the issue of the possible trade-off between financial 
sustainability and social outreach resulting in the mission drift by investigating the relationship 
between the interest rate and borrowers’ income, as well as borrowers’ type. In case of a 
presence of the mission drift, MFIs will charge higher interest to wealthier clients, women, rural 
borrowers, as well as borrowers, engaged in farming. Furthermore, the study also investigates 
whether improved profitability, leverage, and delinquency will allow MFIs to operate more 
efficiently and increase poverty outreach. Such outcome is only plausible in the case of the 
absence of the mission drift.  
Similar to Gonzalez and Rosenberg (2006), in this study, financial sustainability is 
considered to be the driving force behind the development of the microfinance sectors in Russian and the Caucasus. Financial sustainability of microfinance institutions becomes feasible through 
loan expansion, loan portfolio diversification, increase in cost efficiency and loan productivity, 
clients and employees’ training, institutional development, and increase in interest rate to cover 
transaction cost of lending (Khalily, 2004). Microfinance entities, incur three major types of 
costs associated with the provision of a loan: the cost of borrowed funds, the cost of loan default 
provision, and the transactional cost, including client identification and screening cost, loan 
application processing cost, loan disbursement cost, repayment collection cost, and the cost, 
associated with “following up on non-payment.” The transaction cost is the major force pushing 
micro-loan interest rates up (Shankar, 2007). Charging high interest rates may limit the MFI’s 
ability to serve the poor or increase the loan default potential, but MFIs have to cover the costs of 
lending. Conning (1999) concluded that sustainable MFIs servicing poorer borrowers must 
charge higher interest rates and bear higher administrative costs compared to the MFIs targeting 
the marginally poor.  
The loan delinquency is a measure of the MFI’s credit portfolio quality. Pretes (2002) 
emphasizes the seriousness of the loan default in the case of business failure or income decline 
from the MFI’s  and borrower perspective. Because the very poor “have a limited ability to 
assume risk,” they may end up being worse off in the case of business failure (Pretes, 2002). 
Field and Pande (2008) found that switching to more flexible monthly installment schedules 
allows MFIs to save significantly on the transaction costs of repayment collection without 
encountering any added risk of loan default. Shankar (2007) points out that a more flexible 
payment collection lowers the transaction costs for MFIs, thus enhancing operational self-
efficiency and sustainability.  The current study investigates delinquency, a component of financial sustainability, and 
analyzes the relationship between the delinquency rate and operational efficiency, the interest 
rate, the average loan amount, specific borrowers’ characteristics, and overall economic 
conditions. Profit driven MFIs apply strict repayment policies and approach clients more 
conservatively, than outreach driven institutions. The comparison of the quality of loan portfolio 
of MFIs in Russia and the Caucasus will provide the insights into MFIs’ operating conditions 
and show how such conditions, if not homogenous, affect financial sustainability of the 
institutions. 
This study expands upon current empirical work by focusing on the analysis of financial 
sustainability of MFIs in Russia and the Caucasus. To perform quality comparative analysis, a 
broad range of possible factors has been selected to control for socio-economic and political 
differences between the selected countries and sub-regions, including financial indicators and 
region-specific demographic, economic, and poverty characteristics. 
Methodology and Model 
The examination of the MFIs’ performance requires the specific analysis framework. The 
measurement the MFIs’ performance involves five major areas: breadth of outreach, depth of 
outreach, portfolio quality (delinquency), operating efficiency, and profitability (Rosenberg, 
2009). The breadth of outreach can be represented by the number of active clients, including 
borrowers, depositors, clients receiving other financial services, and the number of borrowers' 
accounts. The depth of outreach is usually defined by a rough proxy of the average outstanding 
balance as a percentage of per capita GNI. Rosenberg (2009) stresses that small loan amounts do 
not necessarily imply poor borrowers, while the increase in loan amounts does not manifest the mission drift by the MFI. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use income level of borrowers as a 
measure of the depth of outreach.  
According to Rosenberg, the analysis must also incorporate financial performance 
indicators.  Portfolio quality (loan repayment) is a very important indicator of the MFIs’ 
performance, because high delinquency makes financial sustainability less attainable. The 
standard measure of loan delinquency is portfolio at risk beyond 30 days. Common profitability 
measures include the return on assets and return on equity indicators. Two main indicators that 
measure operating efficiency are the operating expense ratio and cost per client/loan (Rosenberg, 
2009). 
The above described framework is of particular interest to this research.  Recently, 
Quayes (2012) examined the issue of the trade-off between outreach, measured as the average 
loan amount per borrower normalized by gross national income, and financial sustainability, 
approximated with the operational self sufficiency ratio. The results showed that the depth of 
outreach and financial performance are not only positively correlated but, when account for 
dynamic interaction, reinforce each other. The author also asserts that financial sustainability 
positively affects the depth of outreach. Operationally self-sufficient MFIs provide, on average, 
smaller loans. However, Quayes noted that the breadth of outreach negatively affects the 
financial performance. Therefore, contrary to the common beliefs, Quayes argues that policy 
makers should encourage the financial sustainability drive of MFIs. 
Sharing the belief that financial sustainability is crucial under the conditions of shrinking 
and inconsistent donor aid, Ayayi and Sene (2010) investigate the most relevant factors that 
promote financial self-sufficiency of MFIs. A high quality credit portfolio, adequate interest 
rates, and effective management are the three most significant components of the MFIs’ financial sustainability, while the client outreach and the age of MFIs affect it marginally. Specifically, 
Ayayi and Sene state that the portfolio quality as a result of solid credit risk management is the 
determining factor of financial sustainability, as its respective coefficient possessed the highest 
absolute value in the estimation results. The authors note that the percentage of women 
borrowers does not seem to have an effect on financial sustainability. They emphasize that the 
application of adequately high interest rates, as a main source of profit, in combination with 
quality management ensuring adequate cost control and information systems, and effective 
banking practices, are required to achieve and maintain financial sustainability. Moreover, Ayayi 
and Sene found that the same major findings are true for the geographical region, credit method, 
and legal status specifications.  
Similar to Ayayi and Sene (2010) and Quayes (2012), in this study financial 
sustainability of MFIs is considered to be the driving force behind the poverty alleviation 
objective. The financial sustainability is assessed through portfolio quality (delinquency), 
profitability, and poverty outreach indicators. Following the methodology, described by 
(Rosenberg, 2009),  Ayayi and Sene (2010), and Barry and Tacneng (2011), the following 
hypotheses were specified.  
a)  First, loan portfolio quality is assessed through the portfolio-at-risk indicator, 
where the inverse relationship with financial sustainability is assumed, as a 
significant reduction in the MFI’s loan portfolio increases its profits, thus 
positively affecting financial sustainability of MFIs.  
b)  Second, profitability is measured with the application of interest rates that directly 
affect financial sustainability through the generation of adequate profit margins.  c)  Finally, poverty outreach, measured as the average loan balance per borrower, is 
considered to have a positive impact on the financial sustainability of MFIs. 
Determining how the described indicators are affected by various external and internal financial 
(such as socio-economic forces) is crucial for the policy development that, in turn, will enhance 
MFIs’ financial efficiency. 
For every country/region of interest in this study (i.e. Russia and the Caucasus), the 
following SUR model was specified to account for potentially correlated error terms (Zellner, 
1971): 
(1)                   , 
where Y is a profitability, delinquency, or outreach indicator for     region, X is a matrix of 
exogenous MFI-level and Country/Region-level control variables, and    is the error term. 
Based on the general model specification above, the final model with three separately 
estimated equations measuring delinquency, profitability, and outreach, respectively, was 
specified as follows: 
(2)                                                                    
                                                         , 
(3)                                                                        
                                                             
(4)                                                                         
                                                    
where            is a ratio of outstanding principal balance of loans past due more than 30 days 
to outstanding principal balance of all loans;       is the average loan amount per borrower, that 
along with         the percent of women borrowers in each MFI, represents measures of the depth of outreach;       the number of active borrowers, is a measure of the breadth of outreach; 
           a ratio of financial revenue from loan portfolio to the average gross loan portfolio, a 
proxy variable for the interest rate, which along with       return on equity,  represent 
revenue/profitability measures;           , the staff efficiency and productivity indicator, is the 
number of borrowers per staff member; and      , operating expense over loan portfolio, is 
used as an indicator of operational efficiency. In addition,     , the gross loan portfolio, is used 
to control for the size of MFIs, while           debt to equity ratio,           deposits to total 
capital ratio, are incorporated as indicators of financial health of MFIs that capture the funding 
arrangements considered by the MFIs. This study incorporates country-level controls of the 
depth of outreach, such as       the percent of rural population,         the level of regional 
unemployment,         the level of agricultural production as a fraction of the total value added 
in the region’s economy (total value added is equivalent to regional gross domestic product less 
net taxes), and       the average annual per capita income, in all three equations to capture 
country/region specific socio-economic characteristics. Similar to Barry and Tacneng (2011), lin-
log functional form was applied in PortRisk and Gpyield equations, and log-lin specification was 
used in lnLoan equation, similar to Quayes (2012). 
Data 
The study  uses the financial data for the period 2007-2008 (Appendix A) obtained from 
the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX Market) online database (2011) and on the 
regional macroeconomic data obtained from the official national statistical bureaus’ reports and 
databases in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The missing values were approximated 
with those from previous or more recent periods, based on the assumption that they remained 
constant throughout the years. However, 5 MFIs that account for 4.27% of total number of observations were excluded from the data set because of the lack of data for 2007 and 2008 or 
data from other periods to estimate the missing values. The final panel dataset was composed of 
the financial and macroeconomic data from 73 MFIs in Russia and 39 MFIs in the Caucasus. 
Because the number of observations for different regions varied, the Bootstrap Excel statistical 
tool was used to generate the equal amount of observations across the regions (Barreto and 
Howland, 2006). 
Similar to Ayayi and Sene (2010) and Quayes (2012), in this study, the MIX Market data 
were used to obtain the financial and outreach indicators from 112 MFIs in the selected 
countries. The included indicators  are the portfolio at risk beyond 30 days and the borrowers per 
staff member ratio, the return on equity ratio, the operating expense per loan portfolio and the 
debt to equity ratios, the deposit to total capital ratio, calculated as a ratio of MFI’s total deposits 
to total capital, the average yield on gross portfolio in percent, along with the data on non-ratio-
based indicators, such as the average loan amount per borrower, MFI’s gross loan portfolio, the 
number of active borrowers, as well as the percent of women borrowers, calculated as a fraction 
of total women borrowers in the total number of active borrowers in each institution. The 
average yield on gross portfolio is used to approximate the average interest rate, charged by 
MFIs (Srinivasan, 2009).  
 The current study incorporates region-specific macroeconomic indicators, including the 
percent of rural population, the level of unemployment, the average annual per capita income in 
national currency units, and the percent of agricultural output in total value added obtained from 
the official national statistics to capture the differences in poverty levels. Also, to account for the 
environment in which the selected MFIs operate, the study includes the general measures of 
overall socio-economic conditions of the regions (National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2011; National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, 2011; Russian Federation Federal State 
Statistical Service, 2011; The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011).  
MIX Market database has all individual currency figures converted into U.S. dollars. In 
addition, all dollar denominated variables are in 2005 dollars based on U.S. CPI, while non-
dollar values of the annual per capita income in each country, before being deflated by CPI, were 
first converted into U.S. dollars based on the World Bank official exchange rates of 2007 and 
2008 (World Bank, 2011). 
Results 
Though SUR estimation produced identical results, each two out of three equations were 
separately estimated for each country/region with OLS Robust Standard Error (RSE) procedure 
to address the issue of heteroskedasticity. In addition, each equation was tested for 
multicollinearity. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values obtained for all independent 
variables are found to be less than 10 in the two sets of equations. The result rules out any 
serious multicollinearity in the portfolio at risk, the yield on gross portfolio, and the average loan 
amount equations for both Russia and the Caucasus (Appendix B, C, D). Finally, since the data 
are estimated as cross-sectional and not as panel with time co-variates, no serious autocorrelation 
issue is applicable.  
With respect to the portfolio at risk equation, regression results for Russian MFIs, shown 
in table 4.1, suggest significant relationship of the average loan amount, the borrowers per staff 
ratio, a measure of staff efficiency, and the unemployment level to the portfolio at risk. 
Specifically, a 10% increase in the loan size decreases the delinquency rate by 3.1%, and 10 
points increase in staff efficiency decreases risk by 0.2%, again suggesting that more efficient 
Russian MFIs have a better loan portfolio quality. In addition, as anticipated, the increase in the unemployment level further increases the risk associated with the loan default in Russia. The 
regression results for the Caucasus Region, also depicted in table 4.1, showed a significant 
negative relationship between the borrowers per staff member ration and the portfolio at risk. 
According to the results, for every 10 points increase in the staff member’s efficiency, the 
portfolio at risk declines by 0.2% in the Caucasus MFIs.  
In the yield on gross portfolio equation, SUR estimation results were retained due to the 
absence of heteroskedasicity in either of the two country/region equations. Table 4.2 reports the 
estimation results of the equation 6 for Russia and the Caucasus. A negative relationship is found 
between the loan size and the interest rate, where a 10% increase in the loan amount results in 
0.65% and 1.17% decline in the interest rate in Russian and Caucasian MFIs, respectively. This 
result suggests that smaller loans perceived as more risky by both region’s MFIs, which is 
consistent with the earlier explanation that MFIs here lend less to higher risk clients. As a result, 
higher interest rates are charged on smaller loans. A highly significant positive relationship was 
found between the return on equity and the interest rate, suggesting that the more profitable MFIs 
in the two regions become the higher interest they charge, which manifests the mission drift in 
Russian and Caucasian MFIs. A similar significant positive relationship between the increase in 
operating expenses and the increase in interest, found in Russian MFIs, implies that higher 
interest is needed to cover the extra cost of low operational efficiency of MFIs in the region.  
A positive association was established between the share of rural borrowers and the yield 
on gross portfolio in Russia (table 4.2.).  A 10% increase in the share of rural borrowers resulted 
in 2.26% increase in the interest rate. The obtained results suggest that, in Russia, lending to 
rural borrowers is associated with higher risk to MFIs. Apparently, Russian MFIs perceive rural 
borrowers as those with low or unstable income, which makes them high risk borrowers. In contrast, in the Caucasus, rural borrowers engaged in agricultural production are considered to be 
more reliable borrowers than off-farm rural borrowers, as 10% increase in agriculture-related 
borrowers decreases the interest rate by 1.5%. A plausible explanation is that Caucasian MFIs 
see farmers as borrowers with consistent history of employment, income, and marketable asset 
ownership. In contrast, off-farm rural borrowers are deprived of the permanent employment 
opportunities as a result of low economic activity in rural areas resulting in higher 
unemployment levels. Because rural borrowers do not have permanent employment and regular 
income or liquid assets, they are considered less reliable clientele.  
Similarly to the previous equation, in the average loan amount equation, to the absence of 
heteroskedasicity allowed the application of SUR estimation technique. In case of Russia, 
borstaff, women, lninc, and portrisk found to be significantly related to the average loan amount.  
Income is positively associated with the loan size (table 4.3), while the percentage of women 
borrowers is inversely related to the loan amount. Borrowers with higher income are served with 
larger loans, while women borrowers are served with smaller loan amounts. Assuming the 
reverse relationship between the loan size and outreach, small loan disbursements among women 
borrowers manifest the increase in the depth of outreach. In addition, the improved staff 
efficiency positively affects the depth of outreach, and it can be expected that a 10% increase in 
the borrowers per staff member ratio results in reduced loan size by 3.4%, suggesting that as MFI 
becomes more efficient it is able to provide more loans to a larger number of poor clients. 
Similarly, the increased portfolio at risk level results in greater poverty outreach, as MFIs in 
Russia tend to offer smaller loans to protect themselves from growing risk of loan default. A 
10% increase in delinquency rate reduces the loan size by 0.8%, manifesting significant caution 
on behalf of Russian MFIs that in the long-run results in improved poverty outreach. In case of the Caucasus, five explanatory variables, such as borstaff, lnbor, dcratio, rur, 
and lninc are significantly related to the loan size in the Caucasus region loan size equation (table 
4.3). The improvement of staff efficiency by 10% results in a 5.3% reduction in the loan amount, 
which translates into the improved depth of outreach. In addition, the increased number of 
borrowers, a measure of the breadth of outreach, also positively affects the depth of outreach, 
where the growth in the number of borrowers by 10% reduces the loan amount by 0.7%, again 
manifesting the improved poverty outreach by the region’s MFIs. On the contrary, the increase in 
the percentage of rural borrowers, along with the increase in income, translates into larger loan 
sizes, thus negatively affecting the depth of outreach. Also, the improved deposit to capital ratio 
allows Caucasian MFIs to provide larger loans to borrowers, as they accumulate more deposits. 
Conclusions 
The collapse of state-ownership, a consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
created new conditions. A new era of self-employment and small businesses began throughout 
the region. Microfinance has become a mechanism of financial support to small entrepreneurs 
that commercial banks considered “non-bankable.” This study considers financial sustainability 
the key element of poverty outreach expansion. The objective of the study was a comparative 
analysis of the performance of MFIs in Russia and the Caucasus to assess and evaluate factors 
responsible for achieving and maintaining financial sustainability of MFIs. The analysis focused 
on three essential measures of the MFIs’ performance: loan portfolio quality (delinquency), 
profitability, and outreach, measured by the portfolio at risk beyond 30 days, the interest rate, 
and the average loan amount. 
The estimation results for the loan portfolio quality suggested that Russian MFIs lend less 
to high risk borrowers. Furthermore, both in Russian and Caucasian MFIs, the higher borrower-per-staff ratio positively effects the loan portfolio quality. With regard to profitability MFIs in 
Russia and the Caucasus are cautious and conservative in the lending decisions. They also suffer 
from the mission drift. An alarming tendency of the mission drift translates the increase in 
profitability into the increase in the interest rate. Moreover, the mission drift detracts MFIs from 
the objective of poverty alleviation at the early stage of development. With respect to outreach, 
measured by the average loan amount, MFIs in Russia and the Caucasus possess rather 
conservative lending practices. However, they are expected to achieve a greater depth and 
breadth of outreach upon maturation.  
The study has encountered several potentially serious limitations in the data selection 
process. Specifically, some observations were unusable as a result of limited availability of the 
location-specific indicators. Also, the proxy in the form of the yield on gross portfolio was used 
in the absence of data on interest rates.  
From the perspective of future research, it is desirable to track how the relatively younger 
MFIs will weigh between social outreach and financial sustainability goals, as they mature.  The 
contention of the current study is that young ECA MFIs prioritize financial 
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women        -0.034  0.0796  0.654        -0.001  0.0613  0.992 
rur  0.226**  0.1056  0.032        -1.074  0.0731  0.142 
lninc        -1.444  4.5027  0.748        -2.324  2.3297  0.318 
agric        -0.359  0.3720  0.334        -0.496**  0.1856  0.008 
portrisk        0.067  0.0904  0.459        -0.177  0.2124  0.404 
constant        58.204  40.2054  0.148        82.258  18.7734  0.000 
            0.5157            0.1897     
* significant at the 10% level.  ** significant at the 5% level.     Table 4.3. SUR Regression Results for the Average Loan Amount for Russia and the Caucasus 
Variable name  Coefficient  SE   P-value  Coefficient  SE   P-value 
Russia  The Caucasus 
borstaff      -0.004**  0.0008  0.000     -0.006**  0.0015  0.000 
lnbor  -0.020  0.0604  0.736   -0.073*  0.0434  0.093 
roe  -0.000  0.0002  0.517         0.001  0.0020  0.532 
dcratio          0.001  0.0009  0.203    0.232**  0.0961  0.016 
women      -0.032**  0.0054  0.000  -0.006  0.0044  0.184 
rur  -0.010  0.0078  0.201     0.015**  0.0050  0.003 
lninc   0.665*  0.3377  0.049     0.454**  0.1638  0.006 
agric  -0.012  0.0276  0.677         0.001  0.0131  0.937 
portrisk   -0.013*  0.0067  0.056         -0.011  0.0152  0.478 
constant          4.692  2.9762  0.115         4.417           1.3201  0.001 
             0.3775             0.2500     
* significant at the 10% level.  ** significant at the 5% level.   
   Appendix 
Appendix A. Variable Description and Simple Statistics  
1.  The Description and Simple Statistics of Variables Included in the Model for Russia 
Variable 
Name  Variable Description  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Rur  Rural population (percent)  31.92  1.27  0.00  73.78 
Unemp  Level of unemployment (percent)  7.12  0.19  0.77  14.89 
Agric  Agricultural output in total value added (percent)  8.39  0.40  0.00  19.80 
Inc  Average annual per capita income (dollars)  5,010.61  1.02  2,938.87  15,452.70 
Loan  Average loan amount per borrower (dollars)  1,878.46  1.10  162.73  35,274.55 
Glp  Gross loan portfolio (dollars)  1,469,225.08  1.15  6,055.66  1,659,389,385.45 
Borstaff  Borrowers per staff member ratio  86.05  8.72  13.00  627.00 
Deratio  Debt to equity ratio  32.14  9.54  -327.12  871.26 
Bor  Number of active borrowers (people)  784.44  1.11  95.00  64,056.00 
OELP  Operating expense per loan portfolio (percent)  17.40  0.93  2.09  63.07 
Portrisk  Portfolio at risk beyond 30 days (percent)  6.59  0.93  0.00  86.54 
ROE  Return on equity (percent)  94.61  40.67  -653.99  3,806.35 
Dcratio  Deposit to total capital (percent)  28.86  8.82  -269.89  789.96 
Women  Women borrowers (percent)  60.37  1.17  12.82  86.00 
Gpyield  Average yield on gross portfolio (percent)  39.09  1.40  15.21  91.52 
Source: MIX Market (2011); Russian Federation Federal State Statistical Service (2011). 
Note: All dollar values are real, 2005 base.  2.  The  Description and Simple Statistics of Variables Included in the Model for the Caucasus 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Rur  Rural population (percent)  40.08  1.46  0.00  64.79 
Unemp  Level of unemployment (percent)  14.55  0.90  2.18  39.91 
Agric  Agricultural output in total value added (percent)  10.61  0.53  0.01  20.82 
Inc  Average annual per capita income (dollars)  1,670.21  1.04  574.44  3,531.44 
Loan  Average loan amount per borrower (dollars)  1,209.26  1.10  80.19  19,161.32 
Glp  Gross loan portfolio (dollars)  6,016,148.30  1.21  26,844.34  284,726,177.27 
Borstaff  Borrowers per staff member ratio  88.92  4.77  3.00  259.00 
Deratio  Debt to equity ratio  3.32  0.22  0.01  15.35 
Bor  Number of active borrowers (people)  3,934.36  1.18  50.00  104,910.00 
OELP  Operating expense per loan portfolio (percent)  21.74  1.88  1.92  157.66 
Portrisk  Portfolio at risk beyond 30 days (percent)  2.26  0.46  0.00  36.46 
ROE  Return on equity (percent)  9.37  3.56  -288.93  78.90 
Dcratio  Deposit to total capital (percent)  0.36  0.07  0.00  4.87 
Women  Women borrowers (percent)  37.29  1.57  1.94  99.51 
Gpyield  Average yield on gross portfolio (percent)  33.71  1.29  9.17  84.11 
Source: MIX Market (2011); the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (2011); the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan (2011); National Statistics Office of Georgia (2011); the World Bank (2011). 
Note: All dollar values are real, 2005 base.  Source  SS  df  MS 
Model 
Residual 
2389.45619  9  265.495132 
16110.366  136  118.458574 
Total  18499.8222  145  127.584981 
 
Appendix B. Heteroskedasticity and Multicollinearity Tests for the Portfolio at Risk  
1.  OLS Regression for Russia: Breusch-Pagan Test and Variance Inflation Factor Results 
 
  Number of obs =    146 
F(  9,  136) =  2.24 
Prob > F  =  0.0229 
R-squared  =  0.1292 
Adj R-squared =  0.0715 
Root MSE  =  10.884 
  portrisk_ru       Coef.     Std. Err.      t      P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
lnloan_ru  -2.045087  1.358651  -1.51  0.135  -4.731901  .6417277 
borstaff_ru  -.0246098  .0105182  -2.34  0.021  -.0454101  -.0038094 
women_ru  .0751626  .0748462  1.00  0.317  -.0728504  .2231756 
lnglp_ru  .2937847  .7190789  0.41  0.684  -1.128238  1.715807 
gpyield_ru  .0482179  .0644659  0.75  0.456  -.0792674  .1757032 
rur_ru  .0601806  .1100948  0.55  0.586  -.1575385  .2778997 
lninc_ru  4.507546  4.250732  1.06  0.291  -3.898534  12.91363 
unemp_ru  .7115956  .4637964  1.53  0.127  -.2055899  1.628781 
agric_ru  -.4210472  .3511658  -1.20  0.233  -1.115499  .2734045 
_cons  -28.32008  38.29003  -0.74  0.461  -104.0409  47.40077 
 
1.1 estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of portrisk_ru 
 
chi2( 1)  =  198.72 
Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
     
1.2 estat vif 
 










3.60  0.277916 
3.50  0.286097 
2.72  0.367485 
1.92  0.521963 
1.77  0.565548 
1.50  0.665464 
1.45  0.690738 
1.43  0.698512 
1.38  0.724514 










 Source  SS  df  MS 
Model 
Residual 
428.458357  9  47.6064841 
4106.79797  136  30.1970439 
Total  4535.25632  145  31.2776298 
 




Number of obs =    146 
F(  9,  136) =  1.58 
Prob > F  =  0.1282 
R-squared  =  0.0945 
Adj R-squared =  0.0345 
Root MSE  =  5.4952 
  portrisk_cs        Coef.     Std. Err.      t      P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
lnloan_cs  -.7316309  .472216  -1.55  0.124  -1.665467  .2022051 
borstaff_cs  -.0210711  .0088314  -2.39  0.018  -.0385356  -.0036065 
women_cs  .0078313  .0246167  0.32  0.751  -.0408499  .0565124 
lnglp_cs  .2915336  .2158174  1.35  0.179  -.1352584  .7183257 
gpyield_cs  -.0549689  .0319489  -1.72  0.088  -.1181498  .008212 
rur_cs  -.0426058  .028661  -1.49  0.139  -.0992846  .0140731 
lninc_cs  .0674357  .94887  0.07  0.943  -1.809012  1.943884 
unemp_cs  .011208  .0467236  0.24  0.811  -.0811907  .1036067 
agric_cs  -.0901904  .0774092  -1.17  0.246  -.2432718  .0628911 
_cons  8.33523  7.945695  1.05  0.296  -7.377865  24.04832 
 
2.1 estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of portrisk_cs 
 
chi2( 1)  =  106.68 
Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
 
 
 2.2 estat vif 
 










1.40  0.714321 
1.25  0.802298 
1.24  0.807405 
1.23  0.813166 
1.19  0.842391 
1.17  0.855632 
1.16  0.859926 
1.16  0.860657 
1.05  0.951242 
Mean VIF  1.21 
   
 
   Source  SS  df  MS 
Model 
Residual 
21423.0883  10  2142.30883 
19842.9702  135  146.984964 
Total  41266.0585  145  284.593507 
 
Appendix C. Heteroskedasticity and Multicollinearity Tests for the Yield on Gross 
Portfolio 
 
1.  OLS Regression for Russia: Breusch-Pagan Test and Variance Inflation Factor Results 
 
Number of obs =  146 
F( 10,  135) =  14.58 
Prob > F  =  0.0000 
R-squared  =  0.5191 
Adj R-squared =  0.4835 
Root MSE  =  12.124 
gpyield_ru      Coef.      Std. Err.      t      P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
lnloan_ru  -2.729682  1.333806  -2.05  0.043  -5.36754  -.0918236 
lnglp_ru  -.1820332  .8038113  -0.23  0.821  -1.771725  1.407658 
roe_ru  .0061128  .0028752  2.13  0.035  .0004265  .0117991 
oelp_ru  .8612581  .1040412  8.28  0.000  .6554966  1.06702 
deratio_r
u 
-.001717  .0119523  -0.14  0.886  -.0253549  .0219209 
women_ru  -.0325598  .0839866  -0.39  0.699  -.1986594  .1335399 
rur_ru  .2250088  .1113968  2.02  0.045  .0047003  .4453174 
lninc_ru  -2.663025  4.750839  -0.56  0.576  -12.05872  6.732673 
agric_ru  -.41587  .3928348  -1.06  0.292  -1.192776  .3610363 
portrisk_
ru 
-.0108474  .0954528  -0.11  0.910  -.1996236  .1779288 
_cons  67.7803  42.41091  1.60  0.112  -16.09543  151.656 
 
  1.1 estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of gpyield_ru 
 
chi2( 1)  =  1.62 
Prob > chi2  =  0.2033 
 
   1.2 estat vif 
 











3.63  0.275566 
2.88  0.346743 
2.11  0.473125 
1.97  0.507714 
1.93  0.518481 
1.87  0.534345 
1.78  0.561592 
1.40  0.713959 
1.35  0.738056 
1.15  0.872024 




 Source  SS  df  MS 
Model 
Residual 
6815.63906  10  681.563906 
28303.1388  135  209.65288 
Total  35118.7779  145  242.198468 
 
2.  OLS Regression for the Caucasus: Breusch-Pagan Test and Variance Inflation Factor 
Results 
 
Number of obs =  146 
F( 10,  135) =  3.25 
Prob > F  =  0.0009 
R-squared  =  0.1941 
Adj R-squared =  0.1344 
Root MSE  =  14.479 
   gpyield_cs      Coef.     Std. Err.      t     P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
lnloan_cs  -3.886058  1.124546  -3.46  0.001  -6.110063  -1.662052 
lnglp_cs  .1147961  .5814147  0.20  0.844  -1.035063  1.264655 
roe_cs  .0658528  .0297979  2.21  0.029  .0069217  .124784 
oelp_cs  .0615478  .0567676  1.08  0.280  -.050721  .1738166 
deratio_cs  -.2707489  .4867625  -0.56  0.579  -1.233415  .6919176 
women_cs  .021433  .064754  0.33  0.741  -.1066305  .1494965 
rur_cs  -.0992213  .0771013  -1.29  0.200  -.251704  .0532614 
lninc_cs  -2.242679  2.457263  -0.91  0.363  -7.102389  2.617031 
agric_cs  -.4691909  .1958635  -2.40  0.018  -.8565486  -.0818332 
portrisk_cs  -.304519  .2243437  -1.36  0.177  -.7482018  .1391639 
_cons  83.93045  19.79359  4.24  0.000  44.78483  123.0761 
 
   2.1 estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of gpyield_cs 
 
chi2( 1)  =  0.05 
Prob > chi2  =  0.8177 
 
   2.2 estat vif 
 











1.28  0.780143 
1.22  0.822618 
1.15  0.866781 
1.15  0.868463 
1.14  0.874494 
1.13  0.882190 
1.13  0.885796 
1.09  0.918483 
1.07  0.933351 
1.05  0.954454 
Mean VIF  1.14 
   Source  SS  df  MS 
Model 
Residual 
65.931483  9  7.32572034 
108.695595  136  .799232317 
Total  174.627078  145  1.20432468 
 
Appendix D. Heteroskedasticity and Multicollinearity Tests for the Average Loan Amount  
1.  OLS Regression for Russia: Breusch-Pagan Test and Variance Inflation Factor Results 
 
Number of obs =  146 
F(  9,  136) =  9.17 
Prob > F  =  0.0000 
R-squared  =  0.3776 
Adj R-squared =  0.3364 
Root MSE  =  .894 
    lnloan_ru       Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
borstaff_ru  -.0035818  .0007835  -4.57  0.000  -.0051312  -.0020324 
lnbor_ru  -.0191919  .0625619  -0.31  0.759  -.1429118  .1045281 
roe_ru  -.0001239  .000206  -0.60  0.548  -.0005312  .0002834 
dcratio_ru  .0011496  .0009226  1.25  0.215  -.0006749  .0029741 
women_ru  -.0315248  .0055747  -5.66  0.000  -.0425491  -.0205006 
rur_ru  -.0099786  .0080561  -1.24  0.218  -.02591  .0059528 
lninc_ru  .6706641  .3500042  1.92  0.057  -.0214905  1.362819 
agric_ru  -.0115464  .0285748  -0.40  0.687  -.0680548  .044962 
portrisk_ru  -.0126492  .0069091  -1.83  0.069  -.0263123  .001014 
_cons  4.640951  3.084154  1.50  0.135  -1.458151  10.74005 
 
 1.1 estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of lnloan_ru 
 
chi2( 1)  =  0.73 
Prob > chi2  =  0.3913 
     
1.2  estat vif 
 










3.53  0.283190 
2.77  0.360499 
1.93  0.519430 
1.86  0.537960 
1.76  0.569636 
1.24  0.809176 
1.19  0.842550 
1.13  0.881161 
1.10  0.905031 
Mean VIF  1.83 
 
   Source  SS  df  MS 
Model 
Residual 
47.3926561  9  5.26585068 
142.186006  136  1.04548534 
Total  189.578662  145  1.30743905 
 
2.  OLS Regression for the Caucasus: Breusch-Pagan Test and Variance Inflation Factor 
Results 
 
               Number of obs = 146 
                  F(9,136) =    5.04 
            Prob > F  =  0.0000 
            R-squared  =  0.2500 
           Adj R-squared =  0.2004 
           Root MSE  =  1.0225 
  
  lnloan_cs        Coef.     Std. Err.      t     P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
borstaff_cs  -.0061188  .0015491  -3.95  0.000  -.0091823  -.0030554 
lnbor_cs  -.0730296  .0449946  -1.62  0.107  -.1620092  .0159501 
roe_cs  .0011962  .0020298  0.59  0.557  -.0028179  .0052102 
dcratio_cs  .2342209  .0995821  2.35  0.020  .0372912  .4311507 
women_cs  -.0057728  .0045436  -1.27  0.206  -.0147582  .0032125 
rur_cs  .0151303  .0051772  2.92  0.004  .004892  .0253685 
lninc_cs  .453078  .1697417  2.67  0.009  .1174036  .7887525 
agric_cs  .0009665  .0136047  0.07  0.943  -.0259376  .0278706 
portrisk_cs  -.0104325  .0157592  -0.66  0.509  -.0415972  .0207322 
_cons  4.412881  1.367998  3.23  0.002  1.707582  7.118179 
 
1.1 estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of lnloan_cs 
 
chi2( 1)  =  0.01 
Prob > chi2  =  0.9203 
 
 
1.2 estat vif 
 










1.16  0.862822 
1.14  0.873492 
1.11  0.902775 
1.08  0.925715 
1.08  0.928218 
1.07  0.932818 
1.05  0.948103 
1.04  0.964698 
1.03  0.966711 
Mean VIF  1.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 